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Defendants and Appellants,

D. S. BAKER,
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a corporation,
Third-Party Defendant and Respondent,

and
HENRY I. VOORHEES and AILEEN
VOORHEES, his wife, and HILLARD
VOORHEES and PEARL VOORHEES, his
wife,
Third-Party Defendants and Appellants.
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PREFATORY STATEMENT
The Appellants named above are Defendants and
Third-Party Defendants in two civil actions instituted
by Western Development Company, a corporation, as
Plaintiff, to quiet title to certain alleged rights, particularly gas and oil, in lands described in its Complaint.
:Mountain Fuel Supply Company, a corporation, hereinafter referred to as Mountain Fuel, Cross-Complained
against Appellants in both actions, basing its alleged
rights on an Oil and Gas Lease from Plaintiff, Exhibit
"N" (R. 113-116).
Appellants Answered, raising issues as to the ownership of oil and gas, and also Counter-Claimed against
Plnintiff and Cross-Complained against Plaintiff's Lessee, Mountain Fuel, as to Tracts I and III hereinafter
identified, and sought thereby to quiet their respective
titles to the oil and gas rights in said Tracts. After all
pleadings had been filed, a Stipulation was entered into
(R. 55-117), consolidating the two cases, admitting various facts, and stipulating to such facts as being true and
correct, which Stipulation incorporates and includes Exhibits "A" to "0", both inclusive (R. 77-117).
The consolidated cases were submitted to the District Court of Sevier County, Utah, on Plnintiff's ~lo
tion for Sum1nary Judgment (R. 122-123), joined in by
Mountain Fuel (R. 123) as Plaintiff's Lessee, and on a
Cross-l\{otion for Summary Judgment made by Appellants (R.. 125, 261-262). By Order dated April 12, 1954,
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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3
the District Court denied both l\1:otions (R. 263-4).
At a subsequent hearing held J'une 11, 195-±, none of
the parties offered any additional evidence. After the
submission of additional arguments and briefs, the District Court made its decision (R. 290-3) granting Plaintiff's Motion for Surrunary Judgment and denying Appellants' Cross-l\Iotion. Consolidated Findings and Conclusions (R.. 294-3:2-1) and Consolidated Decree and Judgment (R. 325-329) were entered accordingly. The instant A1Jpeal is taken from that portion of the Consolidated Decree and Judgment quoted in Appellants'
Amended Notice of Appeal (R. 334-336).
The actions also involved numerous issues between
Appellants and l\Iountain Fuel on one side and Defendant D. S. Baker on the other side pertaining to purported
Leases from Appellants to Defendant D. S. Baker, which
issues were determined in favor of Appellants and Mountain Fuel and against Defendant D. S. Baker (R. 322323). From such adverse judgment, Defendant Baker
has not appealed or cross-appealed, the time for so doing
having now expired. By virtue thereof, the District
Court's determination is binding and conclusive as to
Defendant Baker, and the issues involving him may now
u,

be ignored, which issues were the subject of a great portion of the pleadings.
Throughout this Brief, certain words or clauses are
shown by us in italics for purposes of emphasis and are

I['

not italicized in any instruments being quoted.
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STATEMENT OF FACTS
The issues before the Utah Supreme Court are limited to a detennination of the ownership as between Plaintiff and its Lessee, :Mountain Fuel, on the one side, and
Appellants on the other side of oil and gas in, under and
upon certain parcels of land in the high mountain ranges
of Sevier County, Utah, identified as Tracts I and III
in the Stipulation above mentioned (R. 5()-57), which
Tract I is shown in brown color on Exhibit" Q" (R. 260)
and which Tract III is shown in red color on said Exhibit

"Q".
In connection with said Tract I (Sections 4 and 17
and the Northwest quarter of Section 9, Township 22
South, Range 4 East, S.L.M. containing 1440 acres), both
Appellants and Hespondents cl'aim such oil and gas rights
as successors in interest to Knight Investment Company,
a corporation, which owned the fee simple title in and
to said lands on and prior to March 29, 1916. On that date
Knight Investment Company 1nade a Deed, Exhibit "B"
(R. 79-81) conveying said Tract I to Isaac D. Voorhees,
the predecessor in interest of the Appellants Henry I.
Voorhees and Hillard Voorhees, which Deed contained
the following reservation provisions:
"R.eserving unto the said grantor, its successo·rs and assigns all the coal, gold, silver, lead,
copper and other precious and valua.ble ores, minerals, mines and mining rights.
"Reserving unto the said grantor, its successors and assigns rights-of-way for roads, railSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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roads, telegraph and telephone lines, water pipe
lines, depot grounds and grounds for building coal
mine appurtenances of all kinds by paying therefor to the party of the second part at the rate of
Six Dollars per acre.
"Reserving unto the said grantor, its successors and assigns the further right to go upon the
surface of the premises herein conveyed, to prospect for coal, gold, silver, lead, copper and other
precious and valuable ores and also for the purpose of making surveys for any and all purposes.
"Reserving unto the said grantor, its successors and assigns the further right to any and all
timber on the surface of the premises herein conveyed, except sufficient timber of aspen quality
fo·r corral and road purposes, which is hereby
reserved to the party of the second part.
"Reserving unto the said grantor, its successors and assigns the further right to any and all
waters that may be developed through tunnels or
other underground workings made or used by the
party of the first part."
\Vhatever title Isaac D. Voorhees obtained to oil
and gas in said Tract I by virtue of such Deed now belongs to Appellants Henry I. and Hillard Voorhees as
his

successor~

in interest. Whatever title to oil and gas

Knight Investment Company reserved and retained h)'
said Deed in said Tract I is now owned by the Plaintiff,
subject to its Oil and Gas Lease to l\f ountain Fuel.
In connection with Tract III described in the Stipulation (H. ;)(i-:>7) and being parts of Sections 5, 6, 7, 8
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and 18, Township 22 South, Range 4 East, and of Sections 1, 12 and 13, Township 22 South, Range 3 Ea~t,
S.L.1I., containing a total of 1280 acres, more or less,
both Appellants Arthur H. and ~orna V. Nell and Luella
T. Voorhees on the one side and Respondents on the
other side claim oil and gas rights as successors in interest to Isaac D. Y oorhees and wife. Said Isaac D. Voorhees owned the full fee simple title in and to said Tract
III on and prior to April 3, 1916, on which date he and
his wife made a Deed, Exhi:bit "D" (R. 85-86-86A) to
Knight Inveshnent Company, the predecessor in interest
of Plaintiff and :Mountain Fuel, its Lessee. Said Deed
was a conveyance of specifically listed rights in and to
the lands described therein, the granting clauses and the
provisions defining the rights and items conveyed being
in the following language :
"WITNESSETH, That the parties of the
first part ... do grant, bargain, sell and convey
... unto the said party of the second part, its successors and assigns, all the coal, gold, silver, lead,
copper and other precious and valuable ores, minerals, mines and mining rights lying or being in
Sevier County, State of Utah, to-·wit:
(particular lands described, including Tract III)
''Together with rights of way for roads, railroads, telegraph and telephone lines, water pipe
lines, depot grounds and grounds for building coal
1nine appurtenances of all kinds, by paying therefor to the parties of the first part at the rate of
$6.00 per acre.
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"Together with the further right to go upon
the surface of the premises herein conveyed to
prospect for coal, gold, silver, lead, copper, and
other precious and valuable ores and also for the
purpose of making surveys for any and all purposes.
"Together with the further right to any and
all timber on the surface of the premises herein
conveyed, except sufficient timber of aspen qua1ity for corral and road purposes, which is hereby
reserved to the parties of the first part.
"Together with the further right to any and
all waters that may be developed through tunnels
or other underground workings made or used by
the party of the second part."
Whatever title to oil and gas rights Knight Investment Company acquired in Tract III by virtue of such
Deed now belongs to its successor in interest, the Plaintiff herein, subject to Plaintiff's Lease to Mountain Fuel.
\Vhatever title to oil and gas in said Tract III Isaac D.
Voorhees and his wife did not convey by said Deed, Exhibit "D", to Knight Investment Company now belongs
to Arthur I-I. and Lorna V. Nell, his wife, and Luella T.
Voorhees as his successors in interest.
On and prior to December 23, 1920, Knight Investment Con1pany was also the owner in fee simple of the
South half and of the Northeast quarter of Section 9,
Township 22 South, Range 4 East, Salt Lake Meridian,
described and identified as Tract II in the Stipulation
(R. 56) and shown in purple color on Exhibit "Q" (R.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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260) and of other adjoining lands, but on said date Knight
Investment Company made to Isaac D. Voorhees a Deed,
Exhibit "C" (H. 82-84), conveying said Tract II to him,
but excepting and reserving "all the coal, hydro-carbons,
gas, oil, gold, silver, lead, copper and other ores or mineral products, with the right and privilege ... in, under
or upon the surface of the land herein granted, to prospect for and 1nine coal, hydro-carbons, or any of the ores
or 1nineral products herein reserved", and containing
further reservation provisions along the lines of those
set forth in Exhibit "B" (R. 79-81). As to said Tract
II, Appellants disclaimed any right, title or interest in
and to the oil and gas therein and thereunder, and all
parties to the consolidated actions stipulated (R. 70) that
the oil and gas rights within and under said Tract II are
vested in Plaintiff, subject to the rights of ~fountain
Fuel by virtue of its Lease from Plaintiff, Exhibit "N"
(H. 113-116). Tract II is not involved in any issues before the Court, except insofar as the Deed on it (Exhibit
''C ") helps disclose the intention of the parties in connection with Exhibits "B" and" D".
Tracts IV, V and VI are not involved in any of the
issues now before the Utah Supreme Court.
The following are matters of general geographical
and historical knowledge of which we feel the Court may
take judicial notice.
All of the lands involved herein are located in the
high plateau or mountain area of Sevier County, Utah.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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Prior to the dates when Exhibits "B" and "C" were made,
~farch 29 and April 3, 1916, respectively, no oil of commercial value nor any gas source or field worthy of the
name had been discovered in Utah, no drilling of any
nature for gas and oil had been conducted in either Sevier
or Sanpete Counties or in the area of these lands or within smne 60 airline or 100 road miles therefrom, and all
oil and gas drillings theretofore conducted in Utah had
been in the low plateaus or swells, valley, river and desert
regions of the state. Certainly it is true that in 1916 the
development of oil and gas in Utah was not of any great
consequence or in the minds of very many people.

It was in 19:20 that The F,ederal Leasing Act pertaining to the leasing of Federally-owned Oil and Gas
Lands was adopted (Act of February 25, 1920). This
gave great impetus to the development of oil and gas
properties and focused attention on oil and gas acreages.
Any further pertinent facts will be developed in
connection with the Argument set forth below.
STA':rElVIENT OF POINTS
I. The District Court .erred in d.et.erminirnq that
/{night Investment Companry reserv,ed by Exhibit "B"

(R. 79-81) the oil and gas within Tract. I above d.e.scribed.
I I. The District Court erred in d,etermining that
lsnac D. Voorhees ·.and wife conveyed t.o Knight Investment Company by Exhibit "D" (R. 85-86A)the oil and
gas within Tract III above mentioned.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN DETERMINING
THAT KNIGHT INVESTMENT COMPANY RESERVED BY
EXHIBIT "B" (R. 79-81) THE OIL AND GAS WITHIN TRACT
I ABOVE DESCRIBED.

We submit that insofar as Utah is concerned, the
matters to be. detern1ined herein are questions of first
impression.

A. Argument based on the assumption t.hat the
Court holds Exhibit "B" to be clear and U'Ylla.mbiguo11s
so as to require construction thereof without resort to
extraneous matters in detennining whether the intent.ion
was to reserve oil and qas.
If Exhibit "B" is held to be unambiguous and is construed on the basis of the Deed itself and from the face
thereof, without resort to extraneous matters, then Appellants contend that such Exhibit shows on its face and
by the language therein contained, construed in the light
~iarch,

1916, conditions, that oil and gas were not
reserved nor intended to be reserved thereby. The Disof

trict Court, by originally denying both Motions for Summary Judgment, determined that the Deed was ambiguous and that resort should be had to extrinsic matters to
determine its meaning and the intention of the parties
with respect to oil and gas. At a further hearing, however, no additional proofs were offered by anyone. The
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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l\[otions for Sunrmary Judgment were reiterated, reargued and briefed, and then followed the Court's decision favorable to Respondents. We submit that whether
or not resort was or is had to extraneous matters, the
decision should have been and should now be that oil
and gas were not reserved by Exhibit "B".
The :Motions for Summary Judgment, made under
Rule 56 (c), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, require the
Court to render a Surnmary Judgment "forthwith if the
pleadings, deposition and admissions on file ... show that
there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that
the moving party is entitled to a Judgment as a matter
of law". Such Motion includes both phases stated above,
that is, if the Deed is not obscure as to whether or not
oil and gas were reserved thereby, then the question
should be determined from the face of the Deed itself,
but if the De,ed is ambiguous as to oil and gas, then the
question should be determined from a consideration of
all pleadings and "admissions on file", including the
Stipulation (R. 55-117).
In either event, matters of which the Court may
and should take judicial notice are to be considered, and
in either event certain fundamental rules of law and
particularly rules of construction are applicable. The
crucial question is:
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

12
Did the parties to Exhibit "B", particularly
the Grantor, intend to reserve the oil and gas in
the property conveyed thereby~
The intention of the parties, particularly that of the
Grantor, is controlling, 16 Am. Jur. 527, 528, 531, 580,
599 and 615. Rules of construction are a 1neans to an
end, being methods of reasoning which experience has
taught will lead to intention. When such rules have been
settled, it is the duty of the court to enforce them; otherwise, titles are rendered uncertain and insecure. Such
recognized canons in deed cases are either identical or
closely analogous to the rules controlling in contract
cases. 16 Am. Jur. 527-8. The problem is to determine
the sense in which the words were used, not what the
words mean in their technical sense. 16 Am. Jur. 580.
In arriving at such intent, we submit that the following fundamental rules are applicable:

(a) The question~as to whether Exhibit" B" reserved
oil and gas is to be determ.ine.d by ascertaining
the intention of the parties thereto a,t the time
and under the conditions existing u-lz en the De.ed
was made.
If oil and gas were reserved by Exhibit "B", reliance for that result must be placed on the words "other
precious and valuable ores, minerals, mines and mining
rights" in the clause reserving "all the coal, gold, silver,
lead, copper and other precious and valuable ores, minerals, 1nines and mining rights", and particularly on the
word "minerals". However, it is of primary importance
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to note here that the reservation was not of "minerals"
alone, but that such word was used with several general
words following an enumeration of specific minerals and
ores.
The bare reservation of "all minerals" without any
amplifying, explanatory or qualifying provisions indicating some other intention, has been held quite generally
to include gas and oil, but where other words used in
connection with the reservation and other provisions in
the deed show the true intention of the parties, any prima
facie rneaning of the term ''minerals" must give way
and the true intention must be effectuated.
Any prima facie meaning must also yield to the
intention considering the facts and circumstances surrounding the parties at the time the instrument was
made. Coltharp v. Coltharp, 48 Utah 389, 160 Pac. 121.

Awnotation, L.R.A. 19'18A 491, which states
that cases construing "minerals" as including oil and
gas are not necessarily opposed to those reaching an
opposite result as regards the particular instrurnent
under construction, and that the words "rninerals, mines
and mining rights'' do not have an absolute definition
when used in legal documents, it being necessary to ascertain the intention of the parties to the instrument in
which the term is used. Prindle v. Baker, 116 W. Va. 48,
178 S.E. 513, 514; Winsett v. Watson (Tex.) 206 S.W. 2d
(i:JG; Dierk LumlJer & Coal Co. v. Myer, 85 Fed. Supp.
137.
See
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In 1916 it appears obvious that the parties were not
thinking in terms of oil and gas. There was no reason
for them to consider such items. How, then, could the
Grantor have been intending by Exhibit "B" to reserve
iterns of which it was not thinking, particularly in view
of the fact that no consideration was given to oil and
gas in determining land values in the Sevier -

Sanpete

area. If the Court places itself in the position of the
parties in 1916 and takes notice of any mutations in
language, we feel the conclusion is inescapable that oil
and gas were not intended to be reserved.

Summers Oil & Gas, Section 135, contains an
excellent discussion on the subject as to "When a grant
or reservation of minerals includes oil and gas". It is
pointed out that when the Grantor, instead of using the
words "oil and gas" uses the term "minerals", a question
arises since that word is not a definite term and its
meaning necessarily depends on the intent with which
it is used. The following language is quoted:
1

"In a restricted and scientific use of the term,
oil and gas are not minerals but hydrocarbon compounds. It is only in a broad sense, if all rnatters
be divided into animal, vegetable and mineral,
that oil and gas may be termed mineral,since they
are neither animal or vegetable ... From the fact
that intention is ... the controlling element ...
it is evident that there is bound to be much apparent conflict of authority, some courts holding
that gas and oil are, and others that they are not,
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included. If, however, the cases are viewed from
the standpoint of intention of the parties, they
may be entirely consistent".

Summers points out that the language of the instrument and the facts and circumstances surrounding
the parties have led courts in a number of instances to
conclude that oil or gas were not included in grants or
reservations of minerals. Various cases to that effect
are quoted by him under Footnotes 25, 29 and 35.
In Rice v. Bla.nton (Ky. 1929) 22 S.W. 2d 580, 232
1\.:y. 195, the court held there was no conveyance of oil
and gas because of the wording of the instruments and
also in view of the extrinsic evidence admitted to explain
intention, even though the words "pipe lines" were used
in the documents involved.
Three Utah cases, to-wit, Nephi Plastering & Mfg.

Co. v. Jttab County, 33 Utah 114, 9·3 Pacific 53; Uta.h
Copper Co. v. Monta.na - Bingham Cons. Minmg Co.,
69 Utah +~:-3, 255 Pac. 672; and Deseret Livestock Co. v.
State .et al, 110 Utah 239, 171 Pac. 2d 401, were cited by
counsel for Respondents in the District Court Arguments
and Briefs, but we submit that not one of these cases is
in point or any authority in the present situation. In
addition, two of them were decided after 1916 and none
had to do with the determination as to whether or not
oil and gas were minerals within the terms of a grant or
reservation.
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In connection with detennining the intention of the
parties, in view of the conditions which existed in 1916,
the Court's attention is directed by way of judicial notice
to the publication "Oil a.nd Gas Po,ssibilities of Utah"
compiled by Dr. George G. Hansen and to Plate II entitled "Oil and Gas W eUs of Utah, 1891-1948", which was
published in connection therewith and is a part thereof.
This publication shows that the closest wells drilled in
Utah to the area involved in the instant Appeal prior to
1916 \Vere in the Hanksville area of Wayne County, both
being "dry" wells, and that -a well was drilled in the Mt.
Pleasant area of 'Sanpete County in 1918 which was also
a "dry" well and was completed after Exhibits "B" and
'' D" were executed.
Furthennore, a "dry" well was drilled at Ephraim,
Sanpete County, Utah, in 1920 prior to the execution of
Exhibit ''C", and during 1920 it is a matter of common
knowledge-and judicial notice that there was a flurry of
interest and excitement in the Redmond-Axtell area in
Sevier and Sanpete Counties, Utah, concerning oil and
gas, and a number of Oil and Gas Leases were taken.
The well-drilling history of Utah prior to 1916 would
certainly tend to show that the parties to Exhibits "B"
and "D" had no reason to be thinking in ter~s of gas
and oil in that year, particularly in view of the location,
elevation and topography of the area covered thereby.
There were reasons in 1920 to think of oil and gas, which
explains the specific mention of those items in the 1920
Deed, Exhibit "C".
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(b) In determining the Grantor's intention, the entire Deed and all of its provisions, clauses and

cont.ext are to be taken into considera.tion, inclu-ding easements or privileg.es which help to
show such intention. 16 Am. Jur. 532, 533, 534.
36 Am. Jur. 305 states the rule as follows:
"In determining what is included in 'minerals' as used in the conveyance, the term must be
construed in the light of the particular transaction and with reference to the nature of the
instrument and its context, and where there is
nothing else showing just what substances the
parties intended to include by the language of the
grant, the intention of the parties as to the extent
of the minerals granted may be determined from
the language of the mining rights granted as incident thereto.''
16 Am. Jur. 533 states that in applying the rule, the
court is not confined to a strict and literal construction
of the language used where such construction will frustrate the intention of the parties, and that particular
words and clauses will not be stressed. It is not sufficient
to resort to isolated words or phrases.
Before citing the case authorities we feel to be in
point on this phase, we call attention to the language of
Exhibit' 'B" which throws light on the intention:
First of all, after enumerating specific items being
reserved, the phrase used is "other valuable ores, minerals, mines and mining rights". Nothing is said about
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drilling or boring rights or wells. The words "mining
rights" help explain the items being identified and reserved, and exclude oil and gas.
Secondly, there is a reservation of rights-of-way for
roads, railroads, telegraph and telephone lines, water
pipelines, depot grounds and grounds for building coal
mine appurtenances, no mention being made of easements
for oil or gas pipelines, tanks, derricks, or anything having to do with boring and drilling for or extracting and
removing gas and oil.
The next "reservation" paragraph reserves the right
to "go upon the surface ... to prospect for coal, gold,
silver, lead, copper and other precious and valuable ores
... '' with no mention being made of any right to drill
or prospect for oil and gas, of even minerals generally,
indicative again of the fact that the parties were not
thinking of oil and gas or intending to reserve the same
but were thinking of ores and minerals of the type they
listed. The reservation of timber also shows the Grantor
was thinking in terms of mines and timbers for use thereIll.

The next reservation is of water "developed through
tunnels or other underground works" which would seem
to eli1ninate water developed by the drilling of wells for
gas and oil, showing again that Grantor did not have in
mind the drilling of wells.
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Every single easement and right reserved is consistent with the conclusion that oil and gas were not
intended to be reserved and is inconsistent with the conclusion that ojl and gas were intended to be and were
reserved.
The Utah Supreme Court has stated the applicable
rule in Haynes v. Hunt, et nl., 96 Utah 348, 85 Pac. 2d
861, wherein it has quoted the following language with
approval:
"A more modern rule and that now followed
by the greater number of court8 is that the whole
deed and every part thereof is to be taken into
consideration in determining the intent of the
grantor, and clauses in the deed subsequent to the
granting clauses are given effect so as to curtail,
limit or qualify the estate conveyed in the granting clause."
Courts in other jurisdictions have had occasion to
determine the intent of the parties to Deeds in a number
of cases involving recitations of ease1nents and privileges
inconsistent with or inappropriate to drilling for oil and
gas and extracting and removing the same. Some of
these are annotated in 86 A.L.R. 987 and 37 A.L.R. 2d
1+53--!. In Murphy v. VanVoorhis (W. Va. 1938) 119
S.E. 297, the Court stated:
"It is apparent that the reservation for mining rights is for oil purposes, and the right of
ingress and egress, and of placing machinery on
the lands for oil purposes. The reservation ex~
pressly so states."
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The Court held that natural gas was not included in
. the reservation referring to 1ninerals, eYen though
ordinarily "1ninerals" would include both oil and gas.
In LlfcKinn.ey's Heirs ·v. Central Ky. Na.tural Gas Co.
(Ky. 1909) 120 S.\V. 31-t, 20 Ann. Cas. 934, the Court
construed the instrrunents as a whole and stated that
if natural gas was in the minds of the parties at the tin1e,
it would be expected to find terms referring specifically
to the rights and privileges necessary to its development,
and ''that the absence of such expressions, and the presence of other ease1nents not applicable to the production of natural gas, tended to show that it was not the
intention that gas was to be included ... If natural gas
was in the minds of the parties . . . we would expect to
find tenns which would refer specifically to the rights ...
necessary to the developrnent of it. We erect derricks
and drill for gas and pipe it to market, but there was not
a grant of a right to the use of timber in erecting derricks
or of an easement for pipelines or with reference to the
removal of machinery used in drilling."
In Hudson r. llfcGuire (Ky. 1920) 223 S.\V. 1101,
17 A.L.R. 148, the words used were "all of the minerals
(except stone coal), are conve~Ted with necessary right
of way~ and privileges for prospecting, 1nining and smelting." The Court held that \Vhile the word "1ninerals"
generally is construed to include oil and gas, the addition
here of "mining and s1nelting" required the introduction
of extrinsic evidence to detern1ine the intention of the
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partie~.

rrhis case discusses not only the point mentioned
above, but covers very thoroughly the various rules and
canons of construction referred to in the instant Brief.
The Court's attention is respectfully called to that case
in its entirety as being peculiarly analogous to our situation. In it the Court calls attention to the fact that the
\Vords "mining and smelting" have no place in the grant
of oil or gas rights or privileges and that the use of these
words, as well as the absence of suitable words to show
that the oil or gas \vas intended to be conveyed, was
sufficient to put a Grantee on notice that the grant did
not include oil or gas.
The Court stated in Sh('ll Oil Co. v. 111 oore (Ill.) 48
X.E. 2d 400, that since the intention of the parties is to
be determined, it follows that anything in the Deed of a
qi1alifying, limiting or explanatory nature may be considered.
In Iluie Hodqe Lu.mber Co. v. Railroad Lands Co.
(La. 1922) 91 So. 676, the reservation of "the exclusive
right to the iron, coal and other minerals" was held to
exclude oil and gas where the following phraseology used
was "all necessary privileges of mining on said land,
and also the rights of way for rail and tramways for
mining 11urposes through any portion of said land herein
conveyed." The Court concluded that only solids, such
as coal and iron were in contemplation, since nothing was
::;aid about boring, drilling or laying l>ipelines.
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The case of Ba.rnard-Arque-Roth-Stearns Oil & Gas
Co. v. Farq~tharson (Eng. 1912) AC 864, Ann. Cas. 1913B
1212, is authority for the conclusion that even though
the reservation was of ''all mines and quarries of metal~
and 1ninerals, and all springs of oil in or under said
land'', natural gas was not reserved since the words used
indicated that "minerals" was not used in the wide and
general sense as including all substances not denominated
vegetable or ani1nal, and also since further words in the
reservation stated that the Grantor reserved the privilege of "search for, work, win, and carry away the
smne", which words were not applicable to a thing of
the nature of natural gas.
Additional cases are annotated in 1 A.L.R. 2d 787
following the case of Carson v. Missouri Pacific Railroad
Co., et al (Ark. 1948) 209 S.W. 2d 97, 1 A.L.R. 2d 784.
In Gordon v. Carter Oil Co. (1924) 19 Ohio App. 319,
a Deed conveyed "all the coal and other minerals" with
the right to enter on the land to make excavations, drains,
etc., and with a right-of-way across the land "for the purpose of transferring said minerals from the land." The
court held that in view of the language used in the Deed
and the circu1nstances and surroundings of the parties
at the ti1ne, oil and gas did not pass under "other minerals," as such was not the contemplation of the parties.
See also Horse Cr,eek Land & lJfhzin.rJ Co.
(1918) 81 \Y. V a. 616, 95 S.E. 26.

'U.

Midkiff
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On the same theory, the Court in Praeletorian Diamond Oil Associ.ation v. Garvey, (Tex. 15) 15 S.W. 2d
698, held that a ~Eneral Lease covering "oil, gas and
other minerals" did not include gravel, since the Lease
provided for the erection of derricks, tanks and pipelines
but contained no provision for mining or disposition of
gravel.
The Court in Gladys City Oil, Ga,s & Mfg. Co. v.
Bight of lVay Oil Company (Tex. 1911) 137 S.W. 171,

states that effect and meaning must be given to every
part of the Deed and that the intent is deducible from
the entire instrument and the language employed therein. To similar import is K entttcky W. Va. Ga,s Co. v.
Preec.e, et al., (Ky. 1935) 86 S.W. 2d 163, in which the

conveyance was "all the coal, salt, water and minerals
of every description ... and the right to use the land for
the purpose of exploring, .ext.racting, storin_q, handling,
manufacturing, r.efin.in.g, shipping or tran,sportin_q all
~aid

minerals." The Court held this conveyance included

oil and gas because the rights granted in connection with
minerals have particular application theerto.
In California, the Courts state that oil may be regarded as a "mineral'' if the word stands alone, but in
Cornwell v. Buck & Stoddard (Calif. 1938) 82 Pac. 2d

516, the Court held that the production of oil was not
"mining" within the meaning of the California Code.
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Dictionary definitions at and prior to the year 1916,
including Black's Law Dictionary, 1910 Edition, Page
780, did not refer to the extraction of oil and gas as being
"mining." In addition to the California case, it was held
in State ·v. Indiw~a, etc., Min. Co., 120 Ind. 575, 22 N.E.
778, 6 L.R.A. 579, and WiUia.ms v. Citizens Enterprise
Co., 153 Ind. 496, 55 N.E. 425, that as ordinarily used,
the term "1nining" does not include sinking wells or
shafts for petroleu1n or natural gas. Since the reference
in Exhibits '' B" and ''D" is to "mining rights," it is
evident that the parties did not intend to reserve in the
one case, or to grant in the other case, oil and gas.
The case of Missouri Pacific Railroad Co., et al., v.
Strohacker, 152 S.W. 2d 557, 202 Ark. 645, analyzes various cases in connection with the construction of reservations referring to "minerals" and emphasizes the necessity of ascertaining the intent from the language used
and the general circumstances existing. The Court refers
to nu1nerous other cases including New Jersey and
United States Supreme Court cases requiring reference
to the time when and the circu1nstances under which the
Deed was made, and stating that a contemporaneous construction is best and should be adopted.

Detlor v. Holla.nd (Ohio 1898) 49 N.E. 690, 40 L.R.A.
266, involved a conveyance in which the language used
was as follows:
"Do hereby grant, bargain, sell, and convey
to the said ~Iichael L. Deaver, his heirs and assigns, forever, all the coal of eYery
. YarietY. ' and
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all the iron ore, fire clay, and other valuable minerals in, on, or under the following described
premises: . . . together with the right in perpetuity to the said _Michael L. Deaver, or his assigns,
of mining and re1noving such coal, ore or other
minerals; and the said Michael L. Deaver, or his
assigns, shall also have the right to the use of so
much of the surface of the land as may be necessary for pits, shafts, platforms, drains, railroads,
switches, side tracks, etc., to facilitate the mining
and removing of such coal, ore, or other minerals,
and no more."
The Court asked the question "Do the words 'other
Yaluable minerals' include petroleum oil~" and then called
attention to the fact that the Deed was made in 1890
al1<l 11m~t be construed in the light of oil developments
as they then existed in the area, that Grantor was not
shown to have any knowledge of the existence of oil in
or near these lands, although oil was then produced in
small quantities within from 10 to 20 miles, but there was
nothing to show the parties had any knowledge thereof,
that the incidents granted were all such as are peculiarly
applicable to the n1ining of minerals in place, and not
such as are in their nature of a. migratory character, such
as oil and gas. The Court further stated that nothing is
:'laid about derricks, pipelines, tanks, the use of water
for drilling, or the removal of machinery used in drilling
or operating oil or gas wells. After stating that the
grant is to he construed most strongly against the Grantor, that the whole contract is to be considered to determine jntention, that onlinarily ''minerals" taken in its
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broadest sense would include petroleu1n oil, and that if
the easernents granted had been intended to be applicable
to producing oil, the parties would have used such words
to express such intention, the Court concluded that the
title to oil did not pass under the conveyance.
The annotations in 17 A.L.R. 156, 86 A.L.R. 983, and
37 A.L.R. 2d 14-±1, discuss the rule now under consideration as well as the other canons herein cited. Other helpful authorities are Carothers v. Mills (Tex. 1921) 232
S.W. 155; U.S. Kentttcky Coke Co. v. Keystone Gas Co.
(6 Cir. 1924) 296 Fed. 320; Clements v. Morgan (Ky.
1948) 2118.W. 2d 1G4, and the following recent decisions:
Easley et al v. Melton et al (Ky. 1953) 262 S.W. 2d 686;
Witherspoon et zcc v. Campbell (:~fiss. 1954) 69 So. 2d
384; Elkhorn Coal Corp. ,et al v. Yonts et al (Ky. 1953)
262 S.W. 2d 384; and Long ·et al v. Madison Coal Co.,
(I(y. 1954) 125 F. Supp. 937, 4 Oil & Gas Rep. 226.
The annotation in 17 A.L.R. 156 follows the case of
Rock House Fork Land Co. v. Raleigh Brick & Tile Co.,
17 A.L.R. 144, a West Yirginia case in which the Court
states that the tern1 "rnineral" is not a definite one capable of a definition of universal application but is susceptible of lirnitation according to the intention of the
parties using it, that in determining its meaning regard
rnust be had not only to the language used but also to the
relative position of the parties and the substance of the
transaction. In this case the Deed granted "coal and all
other minerals" and then went on to grant certain rights
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t~

be enjoyed by the Grantee in the production of such
minerals, including the right to make and maintain ''all
necessary railroads, excavations, ways, shafts, drains,
drainways, and openings necessary and conveniPIH for
the mining and removal of said coal and other minerals,"
and contained other provisions relative to hauling and
transporting coal and other minerals. A number of cases
and authorities are quofed, including Lindley, JJlines &
Jl ining, Sections 87 et seq., 18 R.C.L. 1093, and Sult v. A.
Iiochstetter Oil Co., 63 W.Va. 317-323, 61 S.E. 307. The
Court states that substantial aid is afforded by the language used in the Deed in conveying said mining rights
in determining what the parties meant by the term "other
minerals,'' and states that the rights granted were such
as are incident to the production of minerals by means of
mines; that is, by shafting or tunneling. The West Virginia Court in the Rock Hous,e case cited with approval
the decisions of the Court of Appeals of New York to the
effect that the meaning of words used in a grant will be
construed in the light of the language used in granting
mining rights, and that where the mining rights are those
involved in the ordinary processes of mining, the items
granted will be limited to such things as are recoverable
by such processes.
All of the foregoing authorities support our contention that when the entire Deed, Exhibit "B", and all of its
provisions, clauses and context are considered, including
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the easen1ents or privileges reserved, it is evident that
the Grantor did not reserve nor intend to reserve the oil
and gas rights.
(c) In the construction of deeds, the rule of,ejusdeJJI
generis should be a.pplied. If t.here is an ,enumeration of particttlars, foUowed by a sweeping
clause comprising other things, the scope of such
clause is restricted to things, within the ~esc·rip
tion, of the same kind ~as the particulars e"'VUmerated. 16 Am. Jur. 537. Similarly, the expression
of .a particttlar subject implies the exclusi.on of
subjects not enu.nwrat.ed, or, expressio unius est
exclusio alterius. As stat.ed in 16 Am. Jtlr. 537:
"If a deed CO'I:ers particular or express matters,
the intention ma.y be inferred to exclude oth.er
subjects u·hich the qen,eral words of the deed
may have been sttfficient to include ..."

In Huie Hodge Lttmber Co. ~:. Railroad La.nds Co.
(supra), the Deed reserved "the exclusive right to iron,
coal, and other n1inerals ... " The Court held that the
rule of ejusden1 generis required that the words ''other
minerals" following the specific terms "coal" and "iron"
be construed as intending or including other minerals of a
character sin1ilar to coal and iron, such as solids or minerals in place, requiring 1nining for their removal instead
of drilling. To the same effect are the decisions in Right
of Way Oil Co. v. Gladys City Oil, Gas & Mfg. Co. (Tex.

1913) 157 S. \V. 737, 51 L.R.A. N.S. 268, and Horse Cr,eek
Land & IJlin. Co.

L

ill idkiff (\V. Va. 1918) 95 S.E. 26, and
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the ea~e~ cited in the Annotations in 17 A.L.R. 164, 86
A.L.R. ~)~/, and 37 .A.L.R. 2d 1449, to which the Court's
attention is respectfully invi ted in conne·ction with the
instant point and the other rules rited.
In Hiqht of Way Oil Co. v. Gladys City Oil etc.,
(supra) where the Deed referred to ''timber, earth, stone
and mineral," the Court held that under the rule of ejusdem generis, the word "mineral" should be applied to the
~arne class as the particular words listed, that is, materials found upon land near the surface, as gravel and the
like, and not "mineral oil" ·which js found at great depth
and is of much greater value.
If the parties to Exhrbit "B" had intended to reserve
oil and gas, they would have so stated, just as they did
in connection with Exhibit "C" which was made nearly
five years later in connection with an adjoining tract.
In Vogel v. Cobb, (Okla. 1943) 141 Pac. 2d 276, 148
A.L.R. 71-1-, it was held, applying the rule of ejusdem
generis, that ''water was not conveyed by a grant of the
oil, petroleum, gas, eoal, asphalt and all minerals of every
kind or eharacter" or a grant "of the oil, gas and other
minerals in and under and that may be produced from"
the land.
In Exhibit "B" the case is clear for an application
of the rules of ejusdem generis and expressio unius est
exclusio alterius, since the general or sweeping clause
follows an enumeration of particular item~;, from which it
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should be concluded that the scope of the general clause
is restricted to things of the same kind and character as
the particulars listed, and that having listed these particular ite1ns of a particular type the intention nmst be
inferred to exclude other subjects which the general
words of the Deed may have been sufficient to include.
(d) A Gr,ant is construed most strongly against the
Grantor when t.he lang·uag,e is a.mbiguous 01·
doubtful, particularly in the case of ,exceptions
or reservations. 16 Am. Jur. 599 and 615, 36
Am. J'ur. 303, and Bundy v. Myers .et al (Pa.
1953) 94 A. 2d 724, 2 Oil arnd Gas Rep. 352, in
1chich the reservation clause rf!Aad:

" ... excepting and reserving, out of this
land, the oil, coal, fire clay and minerals of
every kind and character with rights of entry
for the re1noval of the same . . . "
The Court held that gas was not reserved, even
though oil was specifically mentioned, along with "minerals of every kind and character." To the same effect
see Barker v. Campbell-Ratcliff Land Co. (Okla.) lG/
Pac. 468.
As stated in lG Am. Jur. 615:
"Also, in virtue of the rule that a grant is
construed 1nost strongly against the grantor, when
the language of an exception or reservation is
ambiguous or doubtful, it will be construed in such
1vay as to resolve doubts against the grantor in
favor of the grantee, for the grant will not be
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cut down by the subsequent reservation to any
extent beyond that indicated by the intention of
the parties as gathered from the whole instrument."
This rollO\\'S largely because the Grantor selects his own
words and the Deed is prima facie an expression of the
intention of the grantor.
In connection with Exhibit '' B'', the Knight Investment Cmnpany and its agents and officers selected the
words to be used and indicated the items being reserved.
The wording used, as indicated above, shows that gas and
oil were not intended to be reserved, but if any ambiguity
or obscurity exists, such ambiguity should be resolved
against the Grantor in accordance with the foregoing
rule.
\Ye feel that the fair and logical application of the
foregoing rules of construction lead inescapably to the
conclusion that if Exhibit "B" is interpreted on its face
without resort to extrinsic matters of any kind, except
such as the Court may judicially notice in construing
said Deed, that gas and oil were not intended to be nor
were they reserved by virtue thereof.

B. Arg1uncnt based on the assumption tha,t th,e
Court determines Exhibit "B" to be ambignous a,nd to
reqnirc re.sort to extrinsic nwtters to construe the same
and to determine the intention of the parties thereto as
to zclwther gas and oil were r:eserved.
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If, however, the Court determines that Exhibit "B"
is obscure and ambiguous as to whether or not oil and
gas were reserved, then resort should be had to the complete Hecord on Appeal and to any items therein contained to throw light on the intention of the parties. In
this connection, it is pointed out that in Decmnber, 1920,
the same parties 1nade a third Deed, Exhibit "C ", in
which Knight Invesbnent Company expressly reserved
and listed hydro-carbons, gas and oil in addition to the
smne items and language previously used in Exhibit "B"
in March, 1916.
Exhibit "C" is ad1nitted as part of the Stipulation,
and certainly throws light on the intention of the parties
in connection with the 1916 Deeds, since it discloses that
in 1920, after _the drilling of two wells in Sanpete County,
Utah, after the adoption of the Federal Lea.sing Act of
1920, and after a flurry of excitement concerning oil and
gas in the relatively nearby Sanpete-Sevier area, the parties, particularly Knight Investment C01npany, had in
1nind oil and gas and therefore expressly listed the same,
as contrasted to the situation in 1916 when oil and gas
were not listed and were not in the minds of the parties.
The 1920 Deed is very helpful and significant, for
1n it the !(night Investlnent Company and its attorney
and officers saw fit to include and did include a reservation of the Saine ite1ns as those mentioned in the 191G
Deeds, but added three specific ite1ns: "hydro-carbons,
gas and oil."
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In this 1920 Deed the parties were thinking in terms
of oil and gas and so showed. The fact that they used
the :::>pecific words to describe them, at the same time
using the words "mineral products'' shows that they did
not consider that such phrase ''mineral products" included oil and gas. They thus recognized that oil and
gas were not included in the 1916 reservation and grant,
because they had not intended to reserve them, and that
to include them in the 1920 reservation it was not sufficient to rely on the general term "mineral products".
Parties intend to use the words that they do use,
and they intend to use them for a purpose. In 1920 they
intended oil and gas to be reserved and so stated. If they
had been thinking in terms of oil and gas in 1916 and
had wanted to reserve them in Exhibit "B" and convey
them in Exhibit "D", they would have said so.
vVhat better act of the parties is there than the 1920
Deed (Exhibit "C") to show that the parties did not have
oil and gas in mind in the 1916 Deeds, Exhibits "B" and
''D"~

Furthermore, Exhibit "0" (R. 117) shows that the
purpose of the Knight Investment Company under its
Articles of Incorporation was in connection with "mining, smelting, milling" and did not refer to drilling or related activities.
All of the rules of construction listed above apply
and should be given proper effect, even though the Court
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detern1ines that Exhibit "B" was obscure and that resort must be had to extrinsic matters. In other words,
those rules of construction should still be applied and
should be coupled with resort to such other extrinsic
Inatters as may be in the record and as Inay be pertinent
to the inquiry in determining intention.
POINT II.
THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN DETERMINING
THAT ISAAC D. VOORHEES AND WIFE CONVEYED TO
KNIGHT INVESTMENT COMPANY BY EXHIBIT "D" (R.
85-86A) THE OIL AND GAS WITHIN TRACT III ABOVE
MENTIONED.

A. Argument based on the atSsumpti.on tha.t the
Court holds Exhibit uD" to be clear .and un.ambiguons on
its face and to requi.re construction thereof without r.esort to extraneous m.atters in determining whether or
not the intention was to grant oil and gas.
In contrast to Exhibit "B'' which is the subject of
argument under Point I above and which involves the
construction to be placed on rBservations contained therein, Exhibit "D", which is the subject of the instant argument, involves the construction to be placed on grants
contained therein. Exhibit "D" was 1nade under date of
April 3, 1916, or five days after Exhibit "B" was n1ade.
By Exhibit "D'', Isaac D. Yoorhees and wife conveyed
and granted to !(night Invesbnent Cmnpany the items
and rights listed therein, the wording being set forth in
the above Staten1ent of Facts (p. 4). It is to be noted that
the description of the items reserved in the one Deed
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(Exhibit '' B") is identical with the description of the
iten1s conveyed in Exhibit "D ", the properties involved
being different, of course.

It follows that the rights of the

R~spondents

herein
depend, in the case of the properties described in Exhibit
"B" and involved herein, on whether or not Knight In,vestment Company reserved oil and gas by that Deed;
whereas in connection with the properties involved herein
and included in Exhibit "D", Respondents' rights depend
on \vhMher or not Knight Investn1ent Company was
granted the oil and gas by said Deed.
The same rules, canons, principles, and arguments
set forth under Point I above apply to Point II. In addition, however, we point out that in defining the rights and
items being granted by Exhibit "D", the parties used the
same language as that used by Knight Investment Company in connection with its reservations under Exhibit
"B". It appears clear that Knight Investment Company,
therefore, was the author of both instruments. The parties used the language they intended to use. The Knight
Investment Company was interested in certain items,
which it listed and defined in particular tenns followed
by general terms, again calling for the application of the
rules of

eju~dem

generis and expressio unius est ex-

clusio alterius.
Here again, if !{night Investment Company had been
interested in purchasing and acquiring oil and gas, it
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would have been so stated. The grant was not of the
fee sin1ple title, with reservations of certain items as in
Exhibit ''B", but was a grant of a limited and restricted
number of items. Herein again, the mining rights, easements and privileges granted indicate the intention of
the parties as to just what "minerals" were intended to
be and were conveyed by l\Ir. and Mrs. Yoorhees to
!(night Investment Con1pany. Exhibit "D" was a retention by Voorhees of their fee simple title, and a grant of
"coal, gold, silver, lead, copper and other precious and
valuable ores, minerals, Inines and n1ining rights" and of
ease1nents or rights-of-way for roads, railroads, telephone and telegraph lines, \Vater pipe lines (not oil and
pas li.nes or u·ells), depot grounds, etc., by paying certain a1nounts, and of other easements, all of such a nature as to indicate that the parties were thinking of the
Inining of hard or solid 1naterials and not of the drilling
and boring of wells or the extraction, storage, or removal
of oil and gas.
B. Argument based on the assumption that the
Court detennines Exhibit "D" to be obscure and ambigu.ous on its face ,and to r,equire r.esort to ,extraneous matters to const.rue the same and to detemine tclzethcr or
not the parties tlzereto intended to grant oil and gas.
The argtnnents presented above in connection with
Point I (B) apply with equal force and effect to Point
II (B) and for that reason are not repeated.
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\Ve urge upon the Court the conclusion that Exhibit
''D'' did not convey or grant oil and gas rights to Knight
Investment Cmnpany, but served to retain the same in
Voorhees, the predecessor in interest of the Appellants
Arthur H. Nell, Lorna V. Nell, and Luella T. Voorhees,
and that the District Court's decision to the contrary
1s erroneous.
CONCLUSION
In connection with Point I, involving the construction
to be placed on Exhibit "B", we respectfully contend that
the parties thereto did not intend the said Deed to re-

s.erce oil and gas, and that such is true whether the Deed
is construed on its face and without resort to extraneous
matters or whether the Deed is held to be ambiguous and
obscure on its face so as to require resort to the extraneous matters before the Court in the Record on Appeal
in order to determine the intention of the parties to said
Deed with respect to oil and gas.
In connection with Point II, involving the construction to be placed on Exhibit "D ",we respectfully submit
that the parties thereto did not intend said Deed to grant
oil and gas, and that such conclusion should be reached
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scure on its face, is construed in the light of the extraneous matters before the Court in connection with the
Motions for Sum1nary Judgment.
For all the reasons hereinabove stated, the Appellants request that the decision of the District Court be
reversed and that Findings, Conclusions and Decree be
entered in favor of Appellants on their Cross-l\Iotion
for Su1nmary Judgn1ent.
Respectfully submitted,
GUSTIN, RICHARDS &
By

~IATTSSON

CARVEL MATTSSON
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